日時：2025/10/09（木）14：45-17：00

会場：エンレイソウ第二会議室

問い合わせ先：松田新（matsuda.arata.philosophy@gmail.com）

使用言語：英語

プログラム：

Speaker 1: Caspar Hare (MIT) “The Possibility of Intractable Disagreement”

Abstract: Can there be situations in which two people ought to disagree about a matter of fact, when presented with the very same evidence? I say that situations like this are possible. This tells us that there are limits to rational dialogue as a means to resolve conflict.

Speaker 2: Arata Matsuda (Hokkaido University) “The Disagreement-based Argument for Philosophical Skepticism”

Abstract: According to the disagreement-based argument for philosophical skepticism: (Premise 1) philosophers face systematic peer disagreement over most substantive philosophical theses, (Premise 2) if philosophers face systematic peer disagreement over most substantive philosophical theses, then they lack knowledge of those theses, and therefore (Philosophical Skepticism) philosophers lack knowledge of most substantive philosophical theses. There are three main objections to this argument: Premise 1 is false, Premise 2 is false, and philosophical skepticism is self-undermining. In this paper, I address these three objections and offer a systematic defense of the disagreement-based argument for philosophical skepticism. I conclude that, although we lack knowledge of philosophical skepticism, we can still have rational commitment to and understanding of it.