（要旨縮約版）For early Chinese philosophical texts, how does skill relate to dào, the ethically apt path and its performance? In the Mòzǐ, following dào—and thus pursuing the ethical life—is strongly analogous to the performance of skills. The Zhuāngzǐ presents a sharply contrasting stance: there is something more to dào than skill. What is this something more? On a ‘Zhuangist’ view, a key difference between skill and dào is that dào has no fixed, predetermined ends. Dào is a general, open-ended process, one that is continually shifting and transforming. But if dào has no fixed ends, by what criteria can we distinguish more from less fitting paths and more from less adroit ways of pursuing them? A plausible answer is that particular contexts themselves yield provisional grounds for such evaluations. These grounds are then revised or replaced in response to developing circumstances and continuing performance of dào. The resulting approach to understanding and living the good life, I will suggest, can informatively be labeled an ethics of dào and dé (virtue), referring to the path we follow and the capacities by which we follow it.